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nine large banks. The reform substantially enhanced corporate control and strengthened
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1 Introduction
Incentives are at the core of economic analysis and a large body of theoretical and empir-
ical work is devoted to the analysis of incentives. Especially working contracts have been
intensively investigated (see Prendergast, 1999, for an overview). An underlying assump-
tion of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance
and contracts are written with this reaction in mind.
The validity of the latter presumption can often only be inferred from statistical
relationships, since actual working contracts are most of the time not observable to
the econometrician. However, it is not su¢ cient to ￿nd some reduced form correlation
to identify the incentive character of contracts. The statistical correlation of pay and
performance is composed of ex ante correlation￿ more able managers have better perfor-
mance and get paid more￿ and ex post correlation. But only ex post correlation induces
performance and therefore needs to be identi￿ed.
We propose to employ a major shift in the legal and institutional environment for
identi￿cation, using a legal reform as a quasi natural experiment. The institutional
setting substantially in￿ uences the contracts principals and agents optimally agree upon
in three ways. First, it de￿nes the set of enforceable agreements. Second, it sets the
rules of corporate control and hence determines the principal￿ s information. And last
but not least it restricts the agents set of possible and legal actions.
First empirical studies concentrated on the reduced form relation of pay and perfor-
mance, especially they focus on the remuneration of top executives of publicly traded
companies. For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) report in their seminal article that
compensation of CEOs increases by 3.25$ per 1000$ increase in shareholders￿wealth,1
which has been perceived as overly weak incentives for executives.2 Yet, many fac-
tors shape the contracts, so it is hard to argue what would be a good or optimal pay-
1Zhou (2000) analyses Canadian data and Kato (1997) analyses Japanese data. Both report sensitiv-
ities that are somewhat larger than what Jensen and Murphy report.
Core et al. (2003) give a review of the recent literature on stock-based executive compensation and
incentives. Murphy (1999) gives an excellent and very general review of the literature concerning incentive
related pay for managers; John and Qian (2003) review the CEO-compensation literature with special
focus on the banking industry. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) give a general survey of the literature on
corporate governance.
As we will analyse German data, one may wonder if for modern German data the sensitivity of pay to
performance is much di⁄erent to the one for the US. Indeed, the dependency of managerial salaries on
pro￿ts is also reported to be rather weak for Germany (See e.g. Schwalbach and Gra￿ ho⁄, 1997, or Kraft
and Niederpr￿m, 1999a and 1999b). For the period analysed, contemporaries criticised the high salaries
of managers and the low dependency of manager-salaries on performance (Warschauer 1902). However,
Burhop (2004c) argues on the basis of reduced form regressions that the pay-performce sensitivity in
19th century Germany was considerably large.
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performance sensitivity. These factors are in part unobservable ones such as risk-aversion
and the costs and bene￿ts of managerial e⁄ort and in part observable ones such as the
institutional background and ￿rm-speci￿c risk.
Moreover, reduced form results cannot be directly interpreted in a structural way.
For example, Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) or Grossmann (2003) argue that general-
equilibrium e⁄ects already induce some correlation between performance and pay even
without any strategic considerations when able managers are scarce. Additionally, better
quali￿ed managers will work for ￿rms that highly reward performance. Thus, incentive
contracts become a selection device and increase performance but do not induce man-
agers to exert more e⁄ort (Lazear 1986, 2003). Furthermore, performance pay transfers
income risks from ￿rms to managers and ￿rms have to compensate them for these risks.
Total remuneration of managers is thus higher in ￿rms with strongly performance related
pay. Again this yields an ex ante correlation.
To identify the ex post correlation that induces managers to exert e⁄ort large changes
in the legal system can be used since this system de￿nes the deep parameters that
are embedded in the optimal contracts of managers.3 From Conyon (1997) and Core
et al. (1999) we know that changes in corporate governance have some in￿ uence on
the level of managerial compensation. Yet, changes in corporate governance have￿
to our knowledge￿ not been used before as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the
incentive character of contracts,4 probably because large reforms that qualify as such
an experiment are naturally rare. However, we have a unique data set that contains
accounting data from nine large German banks covering the period from 1871 to 1910; a
period in which the stock company act of 1884 falls. This act is arguably one of the most
fundamental reforms the German legal system of corporate governance has undergone
so far.
The act strictly separated control rights between the supervisory and the executive
board of a company and still builds the backbone of the modern German system of
corporate governance. As the reform aimed at solving problems of corporate control,
3In identifying the incentive character of contracts, especially ￿rm-speci￿c risk has played a central
role in a major part of the literature. Theory predicts for incentive contracts that the higher the
volatility of returns is, the higher should be the salary-based pay-performance sensitivity. Empirical
evidence for this is mixed. Aggarwal and Samwick￿ s (1999) results are supportive for the principal-agent
theory, whereas Garen (1994) and Lambert and Larker (1987) do not ￿nd strongly signi￿cant di⁄erences
between high-volatility and low-volatility ￿rms.
4Recently however, Talley and Johnsen (2004) analyzed the interaction of corporate governance,
executive compensation and securities litigation. They provide a detailed model of this interaction and
￿nd that corporate governance serves as a substitute for incentive pay, both, empirically end theoretically.
The paper of Joskow et al. (1996) analyzes the e⁄ects of regulation on incentive pay, too. Yet its focus
is rather on political in￿ uence on compensation packages than on structural identi￿cation.A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 3
we can expect moral hazard to be of lesser importance in the period after 1884 and the
sensitivity of pay to ￿rm performance to decrease substantially after the reform. Indeed,
before the reform the sensitivity is estimated as a 39 M increase in pay per 1000M
increase in pro￿ts. After the reform pay increases only by 14 M per 1000M increase in
pro￿t. Hence, at least the di⁄erence of 25 M can be identi￿ed as an incentive scheme
for which the new corporate governance code has been a substitute.
The remainder of this paper is now organized as follows. In section 2, we present some
historical background information in which we describe the major legal-institutional
shifts of the 1884 legal-reform of the corporate governance code. Section 3 motivates
our identi￿cation strategy with a stylized model of an incentive contract. Section 4 puts
the identi￿cation strategy into an econometric perspective. Then section 5 describes our
data, and section 6 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Historical background
The years 1870-73, the so-called Gr￿nderjahre, were marked by a substantial stock-
market activity: more than 900 new stock companies were founded in Germany between
summer 1870 and spring 1873, and the stock-market index doubled from August 1870
until December 1872. Driving forces for this "new economy" were the complete de-
regulation of stock companies in 1870, the foundation of the German Empire in 1871,5
and the expansive shock of French reparation payments after the German-French War
of 1870-71. The latter shock had an especially strong impact on ￿nancial markets and
on the market for IPOs, since governments of German states and the North-German
federation devoted French payments to repay debt. Supply of government bonds run
short in Germany and in a way forced investors into risky assets and especially the
market for IPOs grew rapidly.
This strong interest in IPOs made corporate control laxer already, but the 1870 stock
companies act even aggravated this. This act replaced stricter laws in most German
states, but it especially softened the tight regulation in Prussia, the most important
member state of the North-German federation. At the time, Prussia￿ s capital Berlin was
the most important ￿nancial center in Germany increasing the impact of the new act
in 1870 on the ￿nancial sector. Before 1870 a royal concession was necessary to found
a stock company and state supervision was compulsory in Prussia. In other German
states the situation was similar. However, after 1870 the new act e⁄ectively liberalized
5This had a positive e⁄ect on allocation and improved institutions. For example, free movement of
goods and factors was introduced and a common currency, the Mark, was established.A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 4
the founding and supervision of companies completely.
Now, virtually everybody could found a stock company. When a company was
founded, only 10 per cent of the capital had to be paid up (40 per cent in case of
stock-market quotation), and the face value of shares was low (only 100 Mark). Con-
sequently, stocks were an investment option also for upper-middle income households,
which suggests a low concentration of ownership as a consequence.6 But not only the
issue of low concentration of ownership made monitoring relatively costly for sharehold-
ers, also the rights of shareholders and of the supervisory board could be restricted.
So-called Gr￿nderrechte granted special rights to the founder of a new company, e.g. a
￿xed pro￿t share for several years.
In addition, the legal rules of corporate governance were weak. The founder of a
company could practically appoint the ￿rst supervisory board, whose members stayed
there for several years. Moreover, the voting rights of shareholders on annual meetings
could be restricted and, ￿nally, publication of a pro￿t-loss statement was not compulsory.
The impact of the liberal regulation was even aggravated by weak threats of punish-
ment for misbehavior. Jointly and severally, these legal shortcomings sometimes lead to
outright fraud and many companies busted soon.
For example, the Schaa⁄hausen￿ sche Bankverein was cofounder and major owner of
the Rheinische E⁄ectenbank in Cologne. Although the Bankverein was the oldest stock
credit bank in Germany and one of the leading institutes during the 1870s it did not
monitor the E⁄ectenbank closely. In consequence, the director of the E⁄ectenbank sold
securities with a value of 6 Million Mark owned by customers of the bank. Then he
registered this transaction as a gain for the bank, giving him a substantial increase in
his bonus payments. Although this was an outright theft, and the responsible director of
Rheinische E⁄ectenbank was sentenced, still it was a good deal for him. The maximum
penalty in the stock companies act was three months imprisonment or a 3,000 Mark ￿ne
(see Burhop 2004a, Chapter 3.3.2; Glagau 1877 for numerous other cases).
This example, and many others, called for the necessity of a reform which was well
recognized by contemporaries.7 Not least the stock market crash of 1873 strengthened
6Unfortunately data on ownership structure are unavailable for this time. Even if ownership was
concentrated most corporate statutes before 1884 imposed a cap of 10 votes for each person attending
the annual meeting of shareholders. After 1884 such statutes became illegal.
7For example, the national-liberal Reichstag member and former law professor Tellkampf demanded
the complete abolition of joint-stock companies. He argued that limited liability was against the foun-
dation of moral and fairness (Tellkampf 1876). Similarly, the Verein f￿r Socialpolitik, the association of
German economist, asked for the restriction of joint-stock companies to certain industrial and economic
sectors; especially railways, banking, and insurance should be free of joint-stock companies.
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this demand for a reform. In 1884 a fundamental reform was ￿nally implemented.
This reform created many central properties of today￿ s German stock-company law.
For the ￿rst time, the new law strictly separated the functions of the supervisory and
executive boards. Moreover, the minimum face value of shares was increased by ten to
1,000 Mark. The shares had to be paid up in full, raising the e⁄ective minimum costs
of a quoted share by the factor 25 and all shareholders got participation and voting
rights for the annual meeting. In addition, publication of a pro￿t-and-loss statement
and an annual balance sheet in the Reichsanzeiger, the o¢ cial newspaper of German
government, became compulsory. Finally, the penalties for misbehavior of supervisory
and executive board members were increased. The new law thus increased the monitoring
incentives and abilities for shareholders, and it increased the misbehavior costs (and
detection risks) for executives. A simultaneously enacted foundation law also removed
most of the founder rights (Ring 1890, Hopt 1980).8
Although the e⁄ectiveness of the 1884-act was questioned by some contemporaries,
this discussion focussed rather on possible extensions of the reform, than on the general
direction of the reform itself (Warschauer, 1902 and Philippovich, 1909). In general, the
reform was perceived as an improvement of corporate control and corporate governance
(Hessberger, 1889, p. 57).
Especially the discretionary power of managers declined together with higher costs
of misbehavior after 1884 and this can be expected to have a substantial in￿ uence on the
economic relationship between principals and agents. Therefore, the reform can be used
as a quasi-natural experiment in order to test for the incentive character of contracts.
3 A simple theoretical model
How the legal reform can have in￿ uenced the manager￿ s contracts may be formalized in
a stylized way in the following costly-state veri￿cation model. Suppose a principal has a
potentially pro￿table project (￿rm) that can only be realized by employing a manager.
This manager is risk-averse and enjoys utility from income x
u(x) = ln(x): (1)
monitoring hampered corporate performance of stock corporations.
8About 15 years after the seminal reform of 1884, a new uni￿ed German commercial law (Handels-
gesetzbuch) was enacted in 1900. Generally, new regulations for stock companies in this 1900 law were
of minor importance. However, the reform further increased punishments for misbehavior and extended
the list of statutory o⁄ences. Additionally, calculation of pro￿ts and accounting rules were further
standardised. See Gareis (1900) for details.A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 6
Her income is composed of her wage w and resources r ￿ 0 she diverts from the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿ts ￿:
Pro￿ts can be high ￿h or low ￿l depending on the success of the project, which
is assumed to be purely random and equally likely for simplicity. However, only the
manager but not the principal can observe ￿ without cost. The principal only observes
￿ ￿ r which the manager announces as the "true" pro￿t. Yet, the principal can pay
some cost C to verify this announcement. When the principal pays the veri￿cation cost,
r and ￿ become commonly observable and if the manager has diverted resources, r > 0,
the principal can claim punitive damage D from the agent.
To further simplify the analysis assume C < D so that the principal always veri￿es
if she would know for sure that the agent has taken resources. Moreover assume that
the agent must at least leave ￿l to the principal in any state.
Now assume the sequence of actions is as follows:




if reported ￿ = ￿h
if reported ￿ = ￿l
.
2. The agent observes ￿: She redirects resources r ￿ 0 to private projects and reports
and pays the residual to the principal.
3. The principal decides whether to verify the agents action, pays the wage and
potentially reclaims damage.
This model can be solved by backward induction.
The principal knows for sure, that the agent has redirected resources, whenever
￿ 6= ￿h;l: In this case she will always verify. If ￿ = ￿h the principal knows that no
resources have been taken and will not verify. If ￿ = ￿l this can either be a result of bad
luck and r = 0 or because the agent has taken r = ￿h ￿ ￿l: Suppose, the agent takes
￿h ￿ ￿l with probability ￿ when in state ￿h: Then, with probability ￿
(1+￿) the principal
observes ￿l although the true ￿ was ￿h: Hence, the principal￿ s bene￿t from verifying
conditional on observing ￿l is ￿
(1+￿)D ￿ C: So she is indi⁄erent between verifying and





: For ￿ < ￿￿; the principal will never verify
and for ￿ > ￿￿; she will always verify.
As the principal will always verify when the manager takes r0 6= ￿h￿￿l; the manager
is strictly better of taking r = ￿h￿￿l if she takes anything. If the manager takes r and the
principal veri￿es with probability p, the manager￿ s expected utility is pu(wl + r ￿ D)+
(1 ￿ p)u(wl + r): The payo⁄from not taking r is u(wh): Hence, the manager will alwaysA Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 7
take r if
pu(wl + r ￿ D) + (1 ￿ p)u(wl + r) > u(wh): (2)
She will take nothing, if pu(wl + r ￿ D) + (1 ￿ p)u(wl + r) < u(wh) and is indi⁄erent
when
pu(wl + r ￿ D) + (1 ￿ p)u(wl + r) = u(wh): (3)
In equilibrium both, the manager and the principal must be indi⁄erent between stealing









(1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿h ￿ wh) +
1
2
(1 + ￿￿)(￿l ￿ wl) (5)
Maximizing E (￿) by choosing wh;l subject to E (u) ￿ ln( ￿ w); where ￿ w is the outside
option wage for the manager, yields the ￿rst order conditions
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) = ￿w￿1
h (6)
￿(1 + ￿￿) = ￿w￿1
l (7)
Hence, we obtain for the optimal wage scheme
wh =
1 + ￿￿




So from that model, we ￿nd that the larger the cost of investigation or the smaller the
maximum damage that can be reclaimed, the more do salaries diverge between good and
bad states. In terms of pro￿t shares, this means, when C is high or D is low, then the
pro￿t share the manager obtains is high. As outlined before, the 1884 reform lowered
the investigation costs for principals and also increased penalties for agent￿ s misbehavior.
Therefore, we can expect the pay-performance sensitivity to decrease after that reform.
Also, one can see that it is in the interest of both, the manager and the principal to
agree on a large penalty. However, legal regulations typically de￿ne maximum penalties
and thus restrict both parties in this pre-commitment. 9
9The interpretation of r as being resources taken from the ￿rm can easily be extende to shirking
within the model. Suppose D is an extra payment the manager gets unless he has been shirking when
the state has turned out to be good. Then r can be reinterpreted as saved e⁄ort by shirking, but the
analysis and the optimal contract prevails.A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 8
4 Identi￿cation strategy and empirical model
Building from our theoretical model, the basic regression for an incentive contract would
be
wit = ￿0 + ￿i + ￿￿it + uit (9)
in which wit denotes the average bonus payment per executive of bank i at time t: The
wage depends on the published pro￿t ￿it with the pay-performance sensitivity ￿:
However, a simple regression using (9) does not identify incentives for managers,
because ￿it and uit may be correlated due to the various reasons outlined in the intro-
duction. Moreover, from our theoretical model, we know that ￿ may actually vary with
changes in legal institutions. Nevertheless, at least the e⁄ect a change in the institution
has on ￿ can be identi￿ed using the di⁄erence between two estimates of ￿ from two pe-
riods in which legal institutions stay constant. Consider two sub-periods, period 0 and
1; for which ￿ di⁄ers. For each period j the simple OLS estimator ^ ￿j asymptotically
converges to ^ ￿j = ￿j +
cov(￿it;uit+￿i)
var(￿it) : Therefore, the di⁄erence ^ ￿0 ￿ ^ ￿1 is asymptotically
unbiased if
cov(￿it;uit+￿i)
var(￿it) is constant for both sub-periods. This allows to unbiasedly
estimate ￿0 ￿ ￿1 as a lower bound for the incentive based pay-performance sensitivity,
since we can expect ￿j ￿ 0 from theory.
Hence, our basic estimation equation is
wit = ￿0 + ￿i + ￿0￿it + (￿1 ￿ ￿0)￿itIt￿1885 + ￿xit + uit: (10)
In this equation It￿1885 denotes an indicator function that takes the value 1 after the
reform in 1884 and zero otherwise. The vector xit represents other covariates that could
in￿ uence bonus payments, e.g. stock-prices, the NNP, and the general stock-market
index.
5 Data Description
Our main data source is Bosenick (1912), who gives detailed information on nine large
German joint-stock credit banks for the years 1871 to 1910. These banks are Schaa⁄hausen￿ scher
Bankverein, Bank f￿r Handel und Industrie, Disconto-Gesellschaft, Berliner Handels-
Gesellschaft, Mitteldeutsche Creditbank, Deutsche Bank, Commerz- und Discontobank,
Dresdner Bank, and Nationalbank f￿r Deutschland. In 1910, the last year for which data
are reported, these banks had total assets of nearly 7.9 billion Mark and they represented
a market share of about 52 per cent of all joint-stock credit banks in Germany.A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 9
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Stock-Price (in %) 320 116.5 33.15 45.37 256.4
Dividends (1000M) 320 4664 4329 0.00 24325
Pro￿t (1000M) 320 5998 5785 -3118 31671
Bonus-Payments (1000M) 320 720.0 794.6 0.00 4804
Bosenick reports total assets, asset and liability structure, pro￿ts, dividends, share
price, and share in the pro￿ts paid to executive and supervisory board members. Since
Disconto-Gesellschaft and Schaa⁄hausen￿ scher Bankverein did not publish pro￿t-loss
statements until 1885, Bosenick (1912) did not include these data. The missing informa-
tion was complemented from archival records (see Burhop 2004a, Chapter 2 for details).
Data for the ￿ Dresdner Bank￿are available from 1873 onwards, and for the ￿ National-
bank f￿r Deutschland￿from 1881 onwards, since these two banks were only founded in
the corresponding years.
For all banks, the executives are known in each year by name from Reitmayer (1999).
Hence, the size of executive board can be calculated. The size of this board varies over
time and between banks. Because of this, we normalize the total bonus paid to executives
by their number to obtain the average bonus.
Table 1 gives a summary statistics of the data de￿ ated to 1913 prices for comparison.
Table 2 presents some data for single banks. Firm performance of banks varies over
the four decades under consideration. In 1871, Disconto-Gesellschaft, Bank f￿r Handel
und Industrie, and Schaa⁄hausen were the largest joint-stock credit banks in Germany.
Forty years later, a di⁄erent picture emerges: now, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and
Disconto-Gesellschaft are market leaders.
Average dividend yield varies only mildly between 4.7 per cent (Berliner Handels-
Gesellschaft) and 5.4 per cent (Deutsche Bank and Bank f￿r Handel und Industrie). Yet,
total stock market return (average dividend yield and average increase of stock market
value) distinctively di⁄ers from 5.8 per cent (Mitteldeutsche Creditbank) to 14.6 per
cent (Dresdner Bank) and 14 per cent (Deutsche Bank).
Finally, total pro￿t shares for boards widely di⁄ered. Averaging over all banks
and four decades, about 10.3 per cent of accounting pro￿ts were paid out as bonus to
executive and supervisory board members. The bonuses paid to the boards of Dresdner
Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft amounted to 15.3% and 14.8% of all pro￿ts respectively,
while Commerz- and Discontobank and Mitteldeutsche Creditbank only paid 5% and
5.4% of their pro￿ts to their board members, see table 2.A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 10
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for single banks
Name Total assets Total assets Stock market Stock market Average Average bonus
in million in million value in value in dividend in percent
Mark Mark million Mark million Mark yield of accounting
(1913 prices) (1913 prices) (1913 prices) (1913 prices) pro￿t
1871 1910 1871 1910 1871-1910 1871-1910
Schaa⁄hausen￿ scher 117 696 61 213 4.9% 6.2%
Bankverein
Bank f￿r Handel 141 906 97 207 5.4% 10.9%
und Industrie
Disconto 189 1,161 112 338 5.1% 14.8%
Gesellschaft
Berliner Handels- 84 554 42 192 4.7% 12.4%
Gesellschaft
Mitteldeutsche 102 227 48 68 4.9% 5.4%
Creditbank
Deutsche Bank 44 2,218 22 542 5.4% 11.2%
Commerz- und 27 454 14 100 4.9% 5.0%
Discontobank
Dresdner Bank 19 1,418 11 334 5.3% 15.3%
Nationalbank 41 447 27 107 5.0% 11.8%
f￿r Deutschland
A shortcoming of our data is that it does not include two possibly relevant parts
of the incentive package. First, we do not have information about the ￿xed salary of
bank managers. Second, share ownership might motivate managers, but again data on
shareholdings of managers is not available.
Although the ￿xed salary of bank executives indeed changed during 1871 to 1913
(Burhop, 2004b) and increased from 12,000 Mark on average during 1871-84, to around
31,000 Mark in 1885-1913 (both in 1913 prices), performance pay still accounted for 70
per cent of total compensation even in the latter period.
The other unobserved part of the incentive package, shareholdings, might have indeed
played a role in motivating managers. In fact, most working contracts of executives and
company statutes stipulated shareholding for executive- and supervisory-board members.
However, compared to the average income of executives, this compulsory shareholding
was of minor importance. Moreover, there is no evidence for a change in compulsoryA Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 11
Table 3: Signi￿cance of a unit-root, Maddala-Wu (1999) Fisher-Test
Variable With No. of individual
Trend rejections at 10%
Pro￿t 0% 5
Bonus (sum of all executives) 0.01% 2
Bonus (per executive) 0% 6
Stock-Price 0% 7
shareholding after 1884.10
In addition to these two unobserved direct incentives for managers, monitoring ac-
tivities of shareholders might vary between banks, for example if shareholding of some
banks was dominated by block-holders. Yet, the general ownership structures of stock
companies are unknown for the German Empire. For modern Germany, Schmid (1997)
shows that the in￿ uence of the ownership structure on executive compensation is rather
weak. Furthermore, any in￿ uence of the 1884 reform on ownership structure which in-
￿ uences incentive contracts can be understood as a substitute for pecuniary incentives
and hence will not bias our identi￿cation strategy, but rather bolster it (see section 4).
A further complication could result from the dynamic structure of our data. Espe-
cially pro￿ts typically show substantial serial correlation. Table 3 shows the results of a
Maddala-Wu (1999) Fisher tests for unit-roots for the relevant variables.11 We can re-
ject the hypothesis of a common unit-root for all relevant variables (pro￿ts, bonuses and
stock prices) on all usual levels of signi￿cance. As the banking sector could be expected
to grow for the time-period we analyze, we allow for a trend.
6 Estimation results
6.1 Basic model
Our basic estimation model is
wit = ￿0 + ￿i + ￿0￿it + (￿1 ￿ ￿0)￿itIt￿1885 + ￿xit + ￿It￿1885 + uit: (11)
Hence, we regress the bonus payment per member of the board of executives of a ￿rm
on pro￿ts and a vector of covariates xit. This vector consists of the price of shares (in %
10Of course managers might have held more than the compulsory number of shares, but data on that is
unavailable. However, the in￿ uence of shareholding will only bias our identi￿cation scheme if managerial
shareholding changed after 1884.
11The test bases on an ADF-Statistics for each individual bank, allowing for variable lag-length, which
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of nominal equity) as an idiosyncratic component, and the stock market index, the real
interest-rate, and the real NNP to control for aggregate shocks.
We estimate the equation using an OLS (with a common intercept), a ￿xed e⁄ects,
and a random e⁄ects estimator. The results are reported in Table 4. The point estimates
do not di⁄er substantially between all three estimators. Hence, a Hausman test does not
reject the random e⁄ects model.
We estimate our central parameters ￿0 and (￿1 ￿ ￿0) as 0.0387 and -0.0248 respec-
tively. This means, that before the reform the bonus of a board member increased by 39
M per 1000M increase in pro￿ts. After the reform the typical executive-board member￿ s
income only increases by 14 M for the same increase in pro￿ts, so that the decrease in
the pay performance sensitivity amounts to 2.5 percentage points. In turn, these 2.5%
give a lower bound for the incentive component in pay before the reform.
The point estimates can also be used to calculate the average incentive package both,
before and after the reform. The average pro￿t after 1884 is 8.640.000 M per bank, before
the reform the average pro￿t is 3.657.000 M (in current prices). Therefore, the increase in
pro￿ts party o⁄sets the decreasing sensitivity in its impact on bonus payments. So that
on average the compensation from direct incentives only decreased from about 142.000 M
(￿0￿it) per manager before the reform to 120.000 M (￿1￿it) after the reform. However,
total bonus payments per executive increased after the reform, since the bonus payment
that does not depend on performance increased by about 78.000 M (￿) on average.
The only covariate that is weakly signi￿cant is the real-interest rate. The estimated
coe¢ cient is negative which may be interpreted as a sign for relative performance evalu-
ation. Economically however, the in￿ uence on the real interest rate on bonuses is minor
and the standardized coe¢ cient is 20 times smaller than the coe¢ cient on pro￿ts.
6.2 Extensions
Yet, our basic approach may be overly simplistic both economically and econometrically
and as a result the estimates could be biased. We assumed the contracts to be homo-
geneous both, across executives and across banks. Hence, heterogeneity in the types of
contracts the banks o⁄er could be a problem. On the side of the econometrics, censoring
could bias results, since bonuses never get negative. Moreover, the dynamic structure
of the data has been omitted. However, the following discussion shows that our results
are very robust to all these complications. For all extensions we drop the insigni￿cant
aggregate factors from the list of regressors, i.e. we only keep the share price and the
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Table 4: Basic regression results
Random E⁄ects Fixed E⁄ects OLS
Coe¢ cient S. E. Coe¢ cient. S. E. Coe¢ cient. S. E.
Pro￿t 0.039 *** 0.003 0.039 *** 0.003 0.039 *** 0.003
Pro￿t*post-1884 -0.025 *** 0.002 -0.025 *** 0.002 -0.025 *** 0.003
Share price -0.225 0.246 -0.267 0.248 0.242 0.262
Stock market index 0.101 0.305 0.128 0.305 -0.182 0.360
NNP 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
Real interest rate -3.855 + 2.208 -3.913 + 2.202 -3.388 2.66
Post-1884 77.95 *** 17.46 77.717 *** 17.41 80.87 *** 20.98
constant -22.35 47.39 -21.91 43.68 -67.56 51.36
R2 (overall) 0.632 0.631 0.637
Wald-test 559.53 *** F-test 78.03 *** 84.86 ***
Hausman test 1.45
￿￿￿ / + denote signi￿cance at the 0.1% and at the 10% level respectively
6.2.1 E⁄ects of tenure and trend in bonuses
So far, we have not used any information about the individual members of the executive
boards of the nine banks in our sample. However, reputation￿ amongst other individual
factors￿ may play a substantial role in the compensation scheme. Moreover, stock com-
panies as banks were relatively new at the time analyzed and hence, when our sample
starts managers may not have acquired as much reputation or knowledge as they might
have for the period after 1884. Therefore, one may argue that our regression simply picks
up this di⁄erence that serves as a substitute for direct incentives, so that our "reform
e⁄ect" would be in fact the e⁄ect of reputation and learning.
Hence, we try to proxy for this by adding in the average number of years num_yearit
the executives have been on the board of bank i up to year t. Moreover, we interact
this term with pro￿ts to see whether managers with a longer history within that bank
get rewarded di⁄erently from more junior colleagues. Additionally we add a linear time
trend to control for general industry growth and ￿ercer competition for managers.
wit = ￿0 + ￿i + ￿0￿it + (￿1 ￿ ￿0)￿itIt￿1885 + ￿2num_yearit ￿ ￿it
+ ￿xit + ￿0It￿1885 + ￿1num_yearit + ￿2t + uit: (12)
Table 5 reports the estimation results for the modi￿ed speci￿cation (12), again using
￿xed e⁄ects and random e⁄ects estimators.
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Table 5: Estimates including tenure and a trend
Fixed E⁄ects Random E⁄ectsa
Coe¢ cient S. E. Coe¢ cient S. E.
Pro￿t 0.040 ￿￿￿ 0.003 0.035 ￿￿￿ 0.003
Pro￿t*Post-1884 -0.026 ￿￿￿ 0.003 -0.031 ￿￿￿ 0.004
Pro￿t*average tenure 0.000 0.000 0.001 ￿￿ 0.000
Share Price -0.387 + 0.217 0.066 0.240
Real interest rate -5.024 ￿￿ 1.601 -3.746 ￿ 1.907
post 1884 74.373 ￿￿￿ 20.392 96.812 ￿￿￿ 25.001
trend -2.402 ￿ 0.966 -0.218 1.037
average tenure 6.978 ￿￿ 2.438 -0.029 2.716
constant -13.343 28.375 -48.800 31.330
R2 (overall) 0.6458 R2 (overall) 0.6571
F(8,329) 80.05 ￿￿￿ ￿2(8) 645.91***
***/**/*/+ denote signi￿cance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
a The random e⁄ects model collapses to OLS
this and since a deterministic trend also has no clear economic interpretation, we do not
include a trend in any further speci￿cation.
The in￿ uence of tenure is only weakly signi￿cant, too. Tenure e⁄ects may in￿ uence
the slope and the average compensation, but the reform e⁄ect remains relatively un-
changed by including tenure and trend. If the inclusion of a trend and tenure has an
in￿ uence on the estimated reform e⁄ect, then they do not decrease the estimate of the
reform e⁄ect.
The direct in￿ uence of tenure on the pay performance sensitivity is positive. This
means, managers who are longer with the ￿rm get more monetary incentives. A possible
explanation could be Holmstrom (1999) career concerns model. Alternatively, in view
of our model, it could be that managers learn to shield themselves from detection of
misbehavior over time which results in larger control costs.
6.2.2 Bank-speci￿c contracts
However, not only the managers di⁄er with respect to their reaction to incentives, but
also banks do di⁄er in their corporate governance. Some banks for example might be
owned by large block-holders while others have a widespread ownership. Moreover, two
banks in our sample ("Disconto Gesellschaft" and "Berliner Handels Gesellschaft") have
at least one fully liable general partner, who also manages (these banks are "Komman-
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di⁄erent pay-performance sensitivities among banks and hence may bias our estimated
reform e⁄ect, when low sensitivity banks have become more important over time.
Therefore, we modify our estimation equation and include bank-speci￿c slopes ￿i of
the bonus with respect to pro￿ts
wit = ￿0 + ￿i + ￿i￿it + (￿1 ￿ ￿0)￿itIt￿1885 + ￿2num_yearit ￿ ￿it
+ ￿xit + ￿0It￿1885 + ￿1num_yearit + ￿2t + uit: (13)
Table 6 reports the results for this regression.12 A Hausman Test rejects the random
e⁄ects model, which in fact is equivalent to the simple OLS.
The "Schaa⁄hausen￿ sche Bankverein" (SBV) has been used as reference bank. Com-
pared with this reference, we ￿nd a signi￿cant and substantial di⁄erence in the pay
performance sensitivity for some banks. Yet, we do not see any very clear-cut structure
in these di⁄erences. "Disconto Gesellschaft", "Berliner Handels Gesellschaft" (BHG),
"Dresdner Bank", and "Nationalbank" have an incentive scheme that rewards perfor-
mance more strongly, while the other banks reward similar to SBV. Disconto Bank and
BHG both have at least one fully liable managing partner, and more performance re-
warding contracts may be a way to expropriate minority holders. The same argument
may hold true for the Dresdner Bank. There the CEO was also a large shareholder, at
least in 1873 when the Bank was founded. He stayed in his position for an extraordinary
long time until he left the board in 1919.
For the Nationalbank the case may be di⁄erent. It was founded in 1881 but very
badly managed in the ￿rst years and was in a deep crisis in 1883 and 1884. Thereafter
the management was exchanged completely. Therefore, the Nationalbank may had to
attract very able managers by strong incentives to get out of crisis.
However, the parameter of most interest, (￿1 ￿ ￿0); does not change substantially
compared to the homogeneous setting. Hence, the estimated e⁄ect seems to be robust
against the ￿rst two extensions of our empirical model. Since both, tenure and ￿rm-
speci￿c slopes are empirical signi￿cant elements we keep them as part of the model for
the econometric extensions we discuss below.
12The bank-speci￿c slopes introduce an incidental parameter problem. Hence, ￿i can only be estimated
when t ! 1: Indeed, our panel is long in the time dimension. So this problem is only of minor
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Table 6: Estimates including bank-speci￿c slopes
Fixed E⁄ects Random E⁄ectsa
Coe¢ cient S. E. Coe¢ cient Std. E.
Pro￿t 0.031 *** 0.003 0.030 *** 0.002
Pro￿t*Post 1884 -0.022 *** 0.002 -0.023 *** 0.002
BHI*Pro￿t -0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.002
Disconto*Pro￿t 0.010 *** 0.003 0.010 *** 0.002
BHG*Pro￿t 0.015 *** 0.003 0.017 *** 0.002
MCB*Pro￿t -0.020 * 0.008 -0.012 ** 0.004
DB*Pro￿t -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.002
Commerz*Pro￿t -0.008 0.006 -0.004 0.004
Dresdner*Pro￿t 0.014 *** 0.003 0.014 *** 0.002
National*Pro￿t 0.051 *** 0.005 0.036 *** 0.003
Average tenure*Pro￿t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share Price 0.159 0.181 0.106 0.160
Real interest rate -2.168 1.359 -2.900 * 1.338
Post 1884 49.450 ** 16.149 37.892 * 15.413
Average tenure 2.808 1.836 4.202 * 1.737
constant -71.166 ** 24.268 -67.594 ** 21.136
R2 (overall) 0.8399 R2 (overall) 0.8645
F(15,322) 86.730 *** Wald￿2(15) 2105.98***
Hausman Test 26.370 **
***/**/* denote signi￿cance at 0.1%, 1%, and at 5% respectively
a The random e⁄ects model collapses to OLS
6.2.3 Controlling for censored data
Besides the additional economic factors, our results could be driven by the fact that
bonuses are bounded by zero, i.e. by censoring. This problem may lead to mis- and
di⁄erently measured pay-performance sensitivities before and after the reform. Hence,
we employ a random e⁄ects Panel-Tobit estimator (see e.g. Hsiao, 2003 for details).
Table 7 gives the results.
Again, we see no qualitative di⁄erence to the previously estimated models, especially
there is no drop in the estimate of (￿1 ￿ ￿0): On the contrary the point estimate becomes
even somewhat larger. From the Tobit model the typical contract before the reform
would promise a 43 M (34 M) increase in pay per 1000M pro￿t, but only 9 M (8 M)
after the reform.
Interestingly, in the Tobit-model with heterogeneous slopes, there is no more addi-
tional bank-speci￿c e⁄ect on pay. Hence, the Panel-Tobit collapses to a pooled Tobit
model.A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 17





Coef. S. E. Coef. S. E.
Pro￿t 0.043 *** 0.003 0.034 *** 0.002
Pro￿t*Post-1884 -0.034 *** 0.003 -0.026 *** 0.002
BHI*Pro￿t -0.003 0.002
Disconto*Pro￿t 0.008 *** 0.002
BHG*Pro￿t 0.016 *** 0.002
MCB*Pro￿t -0.010 * 0.004
DB*Pro￿t -0.001 0.002
Commerz*Pro￿t -0.002 0.004
Dresdner*Pro￿t 0.013 *** 0.002
National*Pro￿t 0.036 *** 0.003
Pro￿t*average tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share Price -0.089 0.188 0.359 0.167
Real interest rate -6.998 *** 1.548 -3.293 * 1.379
post 1884 98.431 *** 18.920 60.552 *** 16.084
average tenure 5.921 2.121 4.503 * 1.778
constant -85.725 ** 25.125 -130.526 *** 23.032
Log likelihood -1817.03 -1734.25
Wald ￿2(7) 1087.68 *** Wald ￿2(15) 2182.98***
***/**/* denote signi￿cance at 0.1%, 1%, and at 5% respectively
a The model with heterogeneous slopes collapses to the pooled tobit
6.2.4 Dynamic models
The last possible econometric complication we want to discuss stems from the dynamic
structure of the data. Therefore, we allow for possible serial correlation in the error-
term. However, this comes at the cost of ignoring the censoring problem. The medium
size of our sample does not allow to use a CLAD estimation technique that controls for
both censoring and serial correlation at the same time. Instead, we employ a Baltagi
and Wu (1999) GLS estimator (both ￿xed and random e⁄ects) and an Arrelano and
Bond (1991) GMM estimator. Estimates are reported in Table 8. Qualitatively the
results again do not di⁄er much across all three speci￿cations and also do not di⁄er
very much to the previous results, but in all dynamic speci￿cations the pay-performance
sensitivity decreases somewhat less after the 1884 reform . The decrease is strongest in
the random e⁄ects speci￿cation, yet a Hausman test rejects the random e⁄ects model.
Both GLS estimators assume an AR(1) error, while the GMM estimation is based on
the assumption of autocorrelation in bonuses (so that the error is an MA process). TheA Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 18
Table 8: Estimates from Dynamic Models
Fixed E⁄ects Random E⁄ects GMM (Arellano/ Bond)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S. E.
Pro￿t 0.022 *** 0.005 0.025 *** 0.004 0.025 *** 0.002
Pro￿t*Post-1884 -0.015 *** 0.003 -0.018 *** 0.003 -0.017 *** 0.002
BHI*Pro￿t -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.004
Disconto*Pro￿t 0.024 *** 0.004 0.019 *** 0.004
BHG*Pro￿t 0.012 * 0.006 0.015 ** 0.005
MCB*Pro￿t -0.019 + 0.011 -0.014 0.009
DB*Pro￿t -0.005 0.005 -0.002 0.004
Commerz*Pro￿t -0.002 0.009 -0.002 0.008
Dresdner*Pro￿t 0.016 ** 0.005 0.016 *** 0.004
National*Pro￿t 0.062 *** 0.008 0.052 *** 0.006
Pro￿t*av. tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share Price 0.318 * 0.157 0.264 + 0.156 0.091 0.161
Real interest rate -0.800 0.881 -0.967 0.890 -3.198 ** 1.169
post 1884 48.484 * 19.330 49.208 * 19.156 43.511 ** 14.249
average tenure 3.488 2.392 2.253 2.211 4.045 * 1.719
constant -116.921 *** 6.827 -93.537 *** 26.831 -1.697 * 0.686
Bonus (t-1) 0.456 *** 0.032
Autocorrelation 0.768 Autocorrelation 0.768
R2 (overall) 0.754 R2 (overall) 0.822
F(15,313) 58.480 *** Wald ￿2(16) 922.450*** Wald ￿2(8) 1207***
Hausman Test 27.9 * Sargan-J ￿2(740) 472.40
***/**/* denote signi￿cance at 0.1%, 1%, and at 5% respectively
a The model with heterogeneous slopes collapses to the pooled tobit
estimated autocorrelation in the error is with 0.768 quite substantial.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used a fundamental reform of the corporate governance code￿
the 1884 stock company act in Germany￿ to test for incentive contracts. We ￿nd the
pre-reform pay-performance sensitivity to be statistically signi￿cant and economically
important. However, the reform decreased this sensitivity substantially (by about 2/3).
In turn, this allows to attribute a substantial fraction of the pre-1884 sensitivity to incen-
tives. As for the post-reform period, naturally we can not exactly di⁄erentiate between
general-equilibrium and incentive e⁄ects in the empirical pay performance sensitivity.
Yet, the large impact the reform itself has points towards a substantial incentive pro-
portion in the sensitivity found, as the reform can not be expected to have wiped outA Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 19
all problems of corporate control but only a substantial fraction.
Our results may also be interpreted in another direction: Given the low pay-performance
sensitivity typically found in studies that use modern data, that is data from a well es-
tablished system of corporate governance, our results may raise a concern whether the
focus on motivation to exert e⁄ort is the right one. The large impact of a legal regula-
tion for corporate control may indicate that not inducing managers to exert e⁄ort seems
to be the major problem for the principal, but rather directing this e⁄ort to pro￿table
activities is the main point of concern.
With this interpretation of our results in mind, an increases in the pay-performance
sensitivity is not necessarily an improvement for the shareholders. Such increase might
well re￿ ect a worsening of institutions of corporate governance.A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts 20
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